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Abstract 
Amongst some of the most important and interesting ethical dilemmas facing street level bureaucrats in 
contemporary public services are those arising from conflicting imperatives in the use of personal data. On the one 
hand, public services are coming under pressure to retain and share more data about identifiable individuals, in 
order better to deal with their problems or to protect communities against the risks they pose. This pressure appears 
to conflict – at least to some degree - with confidentiality norms embedded in the codes of practice of public service 
professions as well as with privacy laws stemming from the European Data Protection Directive and the European 
Convention of Human Rights. 
Furthermore, the ethical dilemmas associated with these conflicting imperatives may be growing more 
acute, as a result of changes in the political and social environment in which public servants work. Firstly, there is 
a widespread perception that information and communication technologies can support the extensive networking of 
public service data systems: this perception is giving rise to pressures to achieve service improvements and cost 
savings associated with the pooling, re-use and exchange of personal data. Secondly, there is a growing view that 
many of problems experienced by individuals, families and very small neighbourhoods can best be addressed by 
multi-agency interventions: this view implies that agencies will share data about these individuals, families and 
neighbourhoods to a greater degree than hitherto. Thirdly, growing pressures on public services associated the 
influence of communitarian ideas about the management of risks may be leading to tendencies to favour the public 
good over individual rights, especially in such fields as policing, child protection, mental health and public health. If 
so, we would expect these pressures to lower thresholds for sharing personal data between agencies.  
This paper presents some provisional findings from a major research project funded by the UK’s 
Economic and Social Research Council.  The project has collected qualitative data from over 200 interviews with 
street level professional workers, managers and information systems managers in 12 cases of local multi-agency 
arrangements (MAAs) in England and Scotland. The data presented in the present paper is from the 8 English 
cases, comprising 138 interviews. These cases were chosen from four policy fields, namely:  
• health and social care for the elderly 
• health and social care for the mentally ill 
• public protection arrangements managing risks associated with violent criminals and sex 
offenders; and, 
• crime and disorder reduction partnerships, which include organisations concerned with planning 
interventions against prolific offenders, domestic violence and drug-related crime.  
 
 These fields have been chosen, for two main reasons. First, in all of these fields, decisions about what 
data to share, when to share them, who to share them with and how to interpret them and use them involve serious 
risks: the decisions made by individual workers may result in the abuse or death of a child, the loss of parole for a 
prisoner, the stigmatisation of a family or the refusal of employment for a job applicant. Decision-making in these 
fields therefore poses ethical problems with potentially serious outcomes for individual clients. Second, in the UK, 
all these fields are currently subject to central government initiatives designed to encourage greater sharing of 
personal data to support more effective multi-agency working. They are all fields, then, in which tensions with 
privacy are coming to the fore. 
The data collected for this project will eventually provide the most comprehensive, detailed evidence yet 
available about the ways in which street level professional workers cope on a day to day basis with the tensions 
between imperatives to share data about needy and risky people, and imperatives to respect their confidentiality and 
personal privacy. The data will also provide evidence about the ways in which the coping strategies of such workers 
may be changing under the influence of changes in the political environment outlined above. A particular facet of 
the analysis will be concerned with the intended and unintended behavioural consequences of the growing use of 
data sharing protocols and other ethical instruments. These instruments are designed to govern the practices of street 
level professionals, and in so doing to protect the privacy of clients, patients, offenders, victims, witnesses and other 
individuals who come into contact with public services in these fields. 
  The overarching hypothesis framing this research is that individual decision-making will be 
shaped by the organisational, cultural dynamics in which it takes place. We are using neo-Durkheimian 
institutional theory as the analytical framework for a series of systematic comparisons:  between MAAs in the four 
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different policy fields: between types of organisation (for example, police, health and social work agencies), between 
organisations that comprise these MAAs and between actors from different professions. These comparisons will 
enable us to assess the nature and influence of organisational dynamics in these fields, and to understand the ways 
that different mixes of institutional forms impinge on data sharing practices in different organisations and among 
different kinds of professional workers. We will also compare the ways in which risks to privacy are perceived and 
managed, and the ways organisational dynamics shape coping mechanisms adopted by individuals to manage the 
fear of blame.  
In turn, this analysis will help us understand the social influences on complex decision making by street 
level workers in policy fields that that are riven with important ethical issues. 
 
Introduction 
In previous papers (6 et al, 2002; 6 et al, 2005a; Bellamy et al, 2005a; Bellamy et al, 2005c), we 
have discussed the reasons for the increasing emphasis in British public services on ‘holistic’ or 
‘joined-up government’ (JUG). We have argued that, as understood by the Labour Government 
that came to power in the UK in 1997, JUG differs significantly from previous attempts to 
increase co-ordination across government, because of its emphasis on multi-agency interventions 
at the micro-level of public services. The present Government’s approach also advocates the 
targeting of resources in areas of greatest need and risk (Kemshall, 2002). Thus, a core aim of 
JUG is to increase capacity for multi-agency interventions in the lives of those individuals, 
families or very small neighbourhoods who are in particular need, or who thought to be at risk of 
coming to greatest harm, or who present the highest risks of harming other people. The three 
imperatives of JUG for social policy are, therefore: 
• to increase efficiency in the use of scarce public resources by concentrating interventions 
on those individuals, families or neighbourhoods who are most in need or at risk;  
• to increase the effectiveness of public services in dealing with them, by increasing 
capacity for co-ordinated, multi-agency action; 
• to develop better information resources – including information systems for sharing data, 
and analytical tools - for identifying individuals, groups, areas at greatest risk, for 
assessing their needs, and for assessing the impact of multi-agency interventions in their 
lives. 
 
As the last bullet point highlights, one important implication of JUG in the social policy field, is 
that street-level agencies are coming under increased pressure to share data about the people they 
deal with in the course of their work, whether they be pupils, clients, patients or offenders. 
Caseworkers also come under pressure to share data about third parties, including the families 
and associates of their clients, or the victims or witnesses of their behaviour. In particular, 
imperatives to share personal data more freely are coming from three sources. First, the present 
Labour Government that came to power in 1997 has launched initiatives in a wide range of 
policy fields, to mandate inter-agency collaboration by means of increased data sharing. 
Prominent examples are to be found in the policy fields we discuss later in this paper. Second, 
the Government investing large sums of money in national, strategic IT systems to support the 
sharing of data between local organisations involved in multi agency arrangements.  At the time 
of conducting the research reported in this paper, only one of these systems, ViSOR, the 
national Violent and Sex Offenders Register, was actually in use. But over the next few years, the 
Government intends to introduce several big new systems, including: electronic patient records 
under NHS Programme for IT (NPfIT, now called Connecting for Health); a database for holding 
basic details of all children in England and Wales to promote data sharing between statutory 
services such as health and education; databases of children and other vulnerable people who are 
considered to be at particular risk in the fields of health and child protection, and a new national 
police intelligence system (the IMPACT project) to promote the sharing of ‘soft’ intelligence data 
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between local police forces. A more detailed list of planned new systems is given in Bellamy et al 
(2005b).  
Thirdly, imperatives to share personal data are being reinforced by a stronger climate of 
blame when agencies fail to share personal data (Raab et al, 2005). In recent years in the UK, 
there has been a series of tragic events which, inquiries subsequently showed, could have been 
prevented if agencies had shared more data with each other about risky or vulnerable people that 
were known to them. Among these cases are those of the schizophrenic, Christopher Clunis who 
murdered a passing stranger while being treated in the community rather than in a hospital; a 
number of cases of children, notably Victoria Climbié (Laming, 2003), who were murdered by 
their parents or guardians, despite being known to social care agencies; and, most recently, the 
murder in 2002 of two ten year old schoolgirls in the Cambridgeshire village of Soham by a 
school caretaker, Ian Huntley, who was known to a police force in another part of England –  
the county of Humberside - as a probable serial sex offender. The Soham case led to a six month 
public inquiry chaired by Sir Michael Bichard who reported in 2004. The Bichard Report heaped 
considerable opprobrium upon senior police officers and social services chiefs for chronic 
failures in their information management processes, and it named junior officers, too (Bichard, 
2004). 
 
Ethical dilemmas associated with data sharing and privacy 
The problem for street level workers and their managers is that pressures on their data 
management arrangements are not coming from a single direction, and that they are therefore 
being forced to make choices between competing and, we would argue, qualitatively different  
values in their data sharing and data protection practices. 
The duty of confidentiality is well established in English common law, and is strongly 
reinforced in the training of professional workers such as medical doctors, nurses, social workers 
and probation officers. There are good operational, as well as sound ethical, reasons for its 
existence. One danger is that, especially in a climate of over-zealous data sharing, front line 
workers seek to avoid blame by passing on large amounts of data without sufficient concern for 
their quality, with the result that they overload colleagues with indigestible quantities of 
information or promote over-hasty interventions based on a misreading of the case (Reder et al., 
1993: 90). Defensive practice can extend to clients, too. If individuals suspect that their 
confidences will not be safeguarded, they may refuse to disclose information, or they may 
misrepresent essential facts about themselves, their relationships, their behaviour and their 
circumstances when professionals compile case records. Trust in professionals may be eroded, 
damaging the effective functioning of public services.  Discourse within the caring professions 
therefore recognises the erosion of privacy as itself a source of risk. 
The duty of confidentiality has, moreover, been strengthened in several important ways 
since the Labour Government came to power in 1997. Partly to encourage medics and patients 
to trust new IT systems, the British National Health Service (NHS) has put new, more rigorous 
arrangements in place to safeguard patient confidentiality, and these arrangements are being 
extended to the social care sector, too. The British Parliament has passed a new Data Protection 
Act (1998) to transpose the European Data Protection Directive (1995) into British Law, and in 
2000 a new Human Rights Act (1998), based on the European Convention of Human Rights, 
came into force. These measures strengthened the British subject’s legal right to privacy, 
including the privacy of their data. One consequence of these changes is that the ethical 
dilemmas created for the management of personal data in British public services have become 
much more salient in political circles (Performance and Innovation Unit, 2002; Department for 
Constitutional Affairs, 2003), and interviews conducted for our present study show that the issue 
is now firmly lodged in the minds of many senior policy makers in British central government. 
While they deliberate, however, street level workers in British public services are obliged to try to 
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find ethically defensible passages between the Scylla of data sharing and the Charybdis of 
confidentiality in their day to day work. 
 This metaphor is apt, because agencies are trying to steer between what are, at bottom, 
irresolvable tensions. One source of difficulty is that data protection legislation, along with much 
of the guidance issued by various authorities,  is couched in terms of high level principles. While 
these principles are probably not hard to decipher in abstract terms, there is nevertheless a 
considerable gap between the articulation of such principles and their operationalization in day 
to day, street-level routines. This problem is compounded by the huge cognitive gap between the 
proximal actions and distal consequences: between the short comings of day to day 
administrative routines and the potentially dire consequences that may sometimes follow from 
them a long way down the road. It takes no great leap of imagination, for example, to understand 
why neither the police chief in Humberside nor the relatively junior civilian workers who input 
intelligence data into his IT systems, were able to foresee the catastrophic outcomes that laxity in 
the filling up of forms and in the recording of data would have for the two Soham schoolgirls.  
Even when workers are alert to the ethical components of day to day administrative or 
professional tasks, by definition, decisions about whether to share personal case data with other 
agencies, must be taken in the absence of all the information that is potentially available about 
that case. For example, a teacher might notice a man hanging round the school gates and wonder 
if he should inform the local police. A policewoman faced with an allegation about a potential 
sex offender might wonder if she should file the incident for recording on the police force’s local 
computer. Her superiors might wonder how long the record should be retained. If the man in 
question has never been charged with, or convicted of, a criminal offence, there would be no 
hard data on the National Police Computer to inform such a decision. Should the force 
nevertheless request other local forces to search their files for softer, ‘intelligence’ data about 
him? Should these forces keep a record of this request, in case other allegations or checks are 
subsequently made about the same man? And how should any of these forces respond if they 
were subsequently asked for a police check about him because he applies for a job, or to join a 
sports club, where he would come into contact with children? 
These examples illustrate an unavoidable dilemma faced by decision-making in this field, 
namely that it is inherently prone to error judgments about the degree of risk presented by a case, 
and that these errors are inevitably compounded by the lack of information at the point where 
the decision has to be made. This being so, agencies are, in effect, forced to choose between the 
risks associated with two kinds of decision errors. False negative errors (under-reacting) take place 
when persons are deemed not to be a danger, or to be in danger, when it subsequently transpires 
that they were. False positive judgment errors (over-reacting’ take place when the converse occurs. 
In many areas of social policy, the risks attaching to both kinds of decision errors are both 
palpable and serious. As recent child protection scandals in the UK and elsewhere have 
demonstrated, a decision not to share data may lead to physical harm to, or even the murder of, 
a child. On the other hand, a decision to share on the basis of inadequate or inaccurate 
information may lead to child wrongly being taken into care, with devastating effects upon the 
child or its family. Or, as in the example above, a man may, perhaps wrongly, be refused a job, 
with equally devastating effects on his career. In either case, the problem for agencies is 
compounded by the knowledge that a perceived miscarriage of justice may generate a heated 
public reaction, with the consequence that blame is heaped on public service workers for making 
the wrong call.  
Faced with these problems, many public service agencies now pay considerable attention 
to formulating detailed guidance and agreeing multi-agency protocols to control the use and 
sharing of personal data in case files. A major reason for investing in new IT systems is that they 
appear to offer the means of embedding controlled data sharing more routinely into everyday 
organisational life. However, as a growing body of research makes clear (Lewis, 1993; Plant, 
1994; Fisher, 2001; Pater and Gils, 2003) - and as our own empirical evidence (discussed below) 
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shows too - guidelines, protocols and codes of all kinds are as much honoured in the breach as 
in the observance. Furthermore, even if agencies try to enforce detailed rules of procedure, 
protocols and codes they cannot resolve the fundamental dilemma we discussed above: that there 
is an inescapable choice, in conditions of imperfect information, between the risk of false 
negative and the risk of false positive judgment errors. Indeed, codes simply introduce systematic 
biases towards one or other type of error. Ultimately, then, social policy agencies are obliged to 
choose between different kinds of risk. Some choices may be systematically embedded in 
policies, protocols and IT systems: others are made through the ad hoc, case decisions of 
individual, frontline workers. And in choosing between different kinds of risk, agencies are 
sometimes forced to choose between different values, which could only be validated by appeals 
to rival ethical systems.  
In making this point, we are running counter to much of the official literature issued by 
central government in this field which speaks optimistically of striking a ‘balance’ between data 
sharing and privacy. In other words, there is an implicit assumption that these two imperatives 
can be brought into a relationship with each other, such that both can be sufficiently 
accommodated and neither is unacceptably damaged. We have argued elsewhere that, as 
articulated in current British government policy, the twin aims of privacy and integration cannot 
always be successfully accommodated (6 et al, 2005a; Bellamy et al, 2005a): indeed, they may 
often be much better understood as a constituting a dilemma than a trade-off. One reason is that 
protagonists often argue from rival value systems. The language of data protection and human 
rights is generally couched in individualist terms that place high value on human rights, especially 
the right to privacy. The presumption is that the privacy of data subjects should always be 
respected, unless they have given informed consent for their data to be shared, or unless there 
are clear and proportionate reasons for sharing without consent. In practice, data protection 
regulators and privacy experts interpret the notion of ‘proportionality’ to imply that the risk must 
be proximal and specific: that is, the presumption of privacy and confidentiality can only be 
overruled if there is a real and present risk of determinate harm. The empirical evidence gathered 
for the project described below suggests that frontline workers do indeed find it relatively easy to 
‘balance’ risk in such cases: those where the risk to an individual’s privacy is countered by a 
tangible and proximal risk to the same individual or, indeed, to other known individuals.  For 
example, it is possible to argue from the same individualist value frame about whether social care 
agency should inform the public utility companies that a vulnerable and demented elderly person 
is in financial difficulties, in order to avoid the risks associated with the withdrawal of the power 
supply to that person’s house. Likewise, it is possible to use such a frame to decide whether a 
Public Protection Panel should inform a prospective landlord about a named sex offender who is 
about to be offered a tenancy in a house close to the residence of a child he once groomed.  
Less tractable tensions arise, however, in relation to risks arise that are by no means 
fanciful,, but which are unspecific, collectivised and distal. This is particularly the case in fields 
such as mental health, crime prevention, child protection and fraud control. In these fields, 
public agencies are claiming wide powers to retain and, sometimes, to share personal data, on the 
grounds that individuals known to them represent a danger of, as yet, unknown severity, (but 
which could well prove severe) to unspecified members of the public an indeterminate future.  In 
such cases, there is often much less consensus about how to weigh the merits of rival claims, 
because the human rights of known individuals (usually the risky person, but sometimes their 
victims or associates, too) are being thrown into competition with the perceived long term 
interests of an impersonal public. Furthermore, this approach is being validated by reference to a 
crude but powerful Utilitarian ethics that, at bottom, values ‘the greatest good’ over individual 
rights, outcome over process, ends over means. Conflicts around these kinds of issues have 
emerged most explicitly in the UK in the aftermath of the Bichard Report on the Soham 
murders. This Report has, for example, encouraged the National Association of Chief Police 
Officers to adopt a more aggressive policy on retaining and sharing ‘soft’ data, on the grounds 
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that scraps of information about a suspected person might eventually add up to a pattern 
indicating severe public risk. This policy has been challenged by the British Information 
Commissioner on grounds of disproportionate threat to individual privacy, and the matter has 
ended up in the High Court. And our research evidence shows, too, that some of our 
respondents, especially those in law enforcement agencies, are in no doubt that many decisions 
they are forced to take involve a straight choice between proximal, specific risks to individual 
privacy and distal, generalised risks to the public.  
 
Data sharing and privacy in multi-agency working: a theoretical framework 
It follows from this discussion that we should not underestimate the difficulties facing frontline 
services in managing the tensions apparent in this field, or the challenges these difficulties 
present to effective inter-agency working. We therefore need much more knowledge about the 
ways in which workers involved in multi-agency working experience and manage these tensions 
in their day to day work, especially in agencies dealing with particularly needy, risky or vulnerable 
people. This paper presents some early and provisional findings from the authors’ current 
research project1. The theoretical framing of this project is set out in 6 et al (2004). It is based on 
neo-Durkheimian institutional theory, from which we developed a set of hypotheses about the 
impact of institutional forms on styles of data sharing and privacy protection in multi-agency 
working in England and Scotland.. Developed from the work of anthropological theorist, Mary 
Douglas and resting on Durkheim’s characterisation of the elementary forms of social 
organisation, this theory emphasises the significance of two key dimensions of organisation – the 
degrees of social regulation and of social integration. Cross-tabulating these two dimensions 
yields four distinct institutional forms, which can be discerned in social life at every scale and in 
every human society (Douglas, 1982a [1978]; 1982b, 1992, 1996; Mars, 1982; Thompson et al, 
1999; Rayner, 1992).  These forms are: 
 
• hierarchy (strong regulation and integration); 
• individualism (weak regulation and integration); 
• enclave (weak regulation, strong integration); and 
• isolate (strong regulation, weak integration)  
 
The overarching hypothesis for the current project is that distinct styles of personal data sharing 
and of absence of sharing (refusal to share, failure to share, inability to share, and so on) will 
emerge in each of these forms. Because many organisations exhibit hybrid institutional 
characteristics, the styles by which they share or do not share data are expected similarly to 
represent combinations of two, three or even all four of the sets of features associated with the 
elementary forms.  
Figure 1 summarises the basic argument framing the project. In each cell, there first 
appears a characterization of the values taken by the institutional variables (the independent 
variables in our project), followed by a summary of the values expected in the ‘style of data 
sharing’ (the dependent variables in our project). Throughout the analysis conducted for the 
project, the term ‘style of data sharing’ is used to capture the specific pattern of sharing or not 
sharing in the social entity in question, including the means, extent and ease to which it occurs, 
or not.  
 
                                                 
1 1 Joined up government; data sharing and privacy in multi agency working. ESRC Award no RES/000/23/0158, 2003-5. 
Project team: Professor Chris Bellamy (Nottingham Trent University), Professor Perri 6 (Nottingham Trent 
University), Professor Charles Raab (University of Edinburgh), Dr Adam Warren (Loughborough University) and 
Dr Cate Heeney (University of Edinburgh). 
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Figure 1: Institutional forms and expected styles of information sharing or absence of it 
 
Negative diagonal (isolate-
enclave) 
Information sharing or lack of it 
defensively driven by avoidance 
of risk 
 
Weak social integration ← → Strong social integration 
 
Strong social regulation ↑ 
 
Isolate: coordination by individual coping 
with constrained circumstance and brute luck; 
Heavily constrained individuals acting 
opportunistically, unable to sustain trust 
Information sharing  
Embraced as opportunistic coping 
Rejection as inconvenient or bothersome 
 
Hierarchy: coordination by rule, role and given 
fact; Centrally ordered community 
Information sharing  
Undertaken as regulated practice 
Rejection justified by lack of formal governance for 
it or because of opposing rules 
 
Weak social regulation ↓ 
 
Individualism: coordination by voluntary 
agreement; instrumental, entrepreneurial 
individuals 
Information sharing 
Commitment to it as managerial strategy 
Rejection as inconvenience or threat to 
managerial or professional control of 
resource 
 
Enclave: coordination by shared mutual 
commitment within bounded group; internally 
egalitarian, but sharply marked boundaries with 
others; held together by shared commitment to 
moral principle 
Information sharing 
Embraced as crusade for saving lives 
Embedded in clientelism 
Rejection as in principle wrong 
 
Positive diagonal (hierarchy-
individualism)  
Information sharing or lack of it 
positively driven by commitment 
or pursuit of opportunity 
  
Proximate source; 6 et al, 2004 : 11 and 15 
Ultimate sources: Douglas, 1982a [1978], 1982b, 1992, 1996; Durkheim, 1951 [1897] 
 
In broad terms, the theory proposes that there will be consistency between the general 
institutional character of the organization – including for this purpose, inter-organisational 
arrangements - and the specific ways in which local agencies attempt to achieve some kind of 
settlement between the potentially competing imperatives of information sharing and privacy.   
How, then, does the theoretical framing of the project help us to understand the ethical 
dimension of settlements between these imperatives? In a recent article (2004) Maesschalck 
proposes that ethical dilemmas arise in public service organizations when their members find 
themselves in situations where they find it difficult to judge with accuracy what would constitute 
ethical behaviour. It is our contention, on the basis of the discussion presented above, that this 
situation holds in relation to tensions between data sharing and integration in multi agency 
working in the UK. Maesschalck further proposes that neo-Durkheimian institutional theory 
would predict that what shapes outcomes in such situations is the particular mix of instiutional 
forms characterizing the social entity in which such tensions arise (Maesschalck, 2004). 
Moreover, organizations characterized by the strong dominance of a particular institutional form 
are likely to over-emphasise the values on which their social solidarity is based to the exclusion 
of other values. The result is that their ability to manage and moderate the behaviours typically 
associated with those forms is actually reduced. Maesschalck argues, therefore, that strong 
institutional forms are likely to encourage unethical behaviour defined as ‘a too radical (and 
therefore misunderstood)’ application of dominant ethical standards (Maesschalck, 2004: 474). 
Paradoxically, then, the excessive assertion of particular kinds of regulation or integration can 
undermine the possibility of an acceptable and stable settlement between competing ethical 
imperatives. And, relating this theory to our own work, we would expect that those organizations 
displaying a mix of institutional forms are most likely to achieve the most sustainable and 
comfortable settlement between data sharing and privacy. 
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The case studies 
To explore the power of this theory, we conducted a programme of qualitative research using 
semi-structured interviews. In line with the clear theoretical framing of the project, we developed 
a stronger theory-driven structure for the interview schedule and a more elaborate, pre-defined 
coding structure than is common in many studies that use such methods. 
 Between November 2003 and January 2005, we conducted 209 individual interviews, 
using three different interview schedules, with managers, frontline professional staff and 
information systems managers in twelve multi-agency arrangements (MAAs) in England and 
Scotland. The MAAs were drawn from the fields of (i) health and social care for older people, (ii) 
health and social care for people with mental health problems, (iii) crime and disorder reduction, 
and (iv) public protection from violent and sex offenders. Eight cases were in England and four 
were in Scotland. The sample includes MAAs in urban, rural and mixed localities. It was carefully 
selected, too, to contain MAAs that were identified by desk research and a preliminary set of 
interviews with senior policy makers, to reflect various levels of experience and success in multi 
agency working.  In this paper, we present findings from the eight local English case studies, 
which comprise about 55 organisations. The data is taken from 138 interviews, each lasting 
about an hour.. 
Figure 2 below presents some basic information about each MAA in our sample. The 
sample is divided equally between the different fields listed above: two from each field. Within 
health and social care, MAAs were composed of local implementation teams for the National 
Service Frameworks for care for older people and for mental health care. In all these fields, 
multi-agency working between various health agencies and various social care agencies is 
specifically mandated by central government, either in legislation or else by formal policy 
guidance, and embraces agencies in both the statutory and voluntary sectors. Data sharing is 
explicitly permitted by legislation that supplements data protection law, and by a range of formal 
policy instruments, rules and protocols. As we have seen, it is also being embedded in new IT 
systems. By these means, agencies are required to make joint assessments and to provide 
integrated care to their clients. This involves the sharing of client information on a ‘need to 
know’ basis between medical and social work professionals who are trained in different ways and 
subject to different professional codes. In both cases, a rich body of related information about 
relatives, neighbours and, in some rare mental health cases, third parties who may be affected by 
the case, needs to be handled with great care.  
Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPAs) promote inter-agency 
cooperation to identify and manage risks presented by violent and sexual offenders living in the 
community (e.g. on parole or after release from prison). They typically source data about risky 
people and their victims from the police, probation service and prisons. Data is also sourced 
from, and shared with, health authorities, housing authorities and social care agencies.  Crime 
and Disorder Reduction Partnerships (CDRPs) are local collaborative partnerships set up to 
analyse local crime statistics, plan crime reduction programmes and work with those at risk of 
offending or victimisation. CDRPs source data from a range of agencies, including police and 
probation services, courts, health authorities, social care agencies and education authorities.  
Much of these data are aggregated or otherwise anonymised, but some of them relate to very 
small neighbourhoods, or very small groups of offenders or victims. So true anonymisation is 
not always possible.  
These fields were therefore selected for our sample because the work of agencies in them 
involves inescapable ethical dilemmas to do with: 
• handling very sensitive information; 
• making decisions about whether, when, why and exactly what to share about an 
individual with other agencies; 
• making such decisions in the absence of full information; and 
• deciding where decisions must be made urgently about risk.  
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Thus, multi agency working in these fields presents challenges both to the sufficiency of 
sharing for the purpose of integrated service delivery and risk management, and, at the same 
time, to the protection of appropriate confidentiality for all the categories of individuals about 
whom records are held 
 
Figure 2: Summary characteristics of the case studies: MAA level 
 
Case 
study 
(former 
labels in 
brackets) 
Country Health and 
social care or 
crime and 
disorder 
(HSC / CD) 
Geographica
l character 
Clientele MAA 
mandatory or 
voluntary 
(M/V) 
Organisations in MAA (number, 
types) 
1 England HSC rural mental health M  24 (includingMH Trust, NHS 
Care Trust, social services, 
voluntary sector, private sector) 
2 England HSC inner 
urban 
mental health M  14 (including social services, MH 
Trust, PCT, other voluntary 
groups). Additionally, an 
unspecified number of sheltered 
housing providers and GPs. 
3 England HSC inner 
urban and 
suburban 
Older people M – 
partnership 
working 
mandatory, 
some 
discretion over 
form and 
members 
5 partners interviewed (PCT, 
social services, housing, 2 
voluntary bodies). Key NSF work 
done by a Strategy Group for 
Older People 
4 England HSC urban Older people  M – 
partnership 
working 
mandatory, 
some 
discretion over 
form and 
members 
5 organisations interviewed. 
Approximately 25 organisations in 
total, including housing; 
PCT,social services and voluntary 
bodies 
5 England CD urban offenders 
(CDRP) 
M  8 statutory orgs plus c40-50 
voluntary orgs, including LA 
community safety; police; fire 
brigade; national charity 
6 England CD rural offenders 
(CDRP) 
M  8 ‘responsible authorities’, 
including police, LA community 
safety, PCT, Fire and Rescue. 
Approx 21 partners in total. 
7 England CD mixed: 
small city 
and rural 
violent and 
sexual 
offenders 
(MAPPA) 
M  Approximately 20, although 
number is expanding, including 
probation, police, housing, 
voluntary sector, health sector, 
education, private security firm) 
8 England CD large 
conurbatio
n 
violent and 
sexual 
offenders 
(MAPPA) 
M  3 organisations as ‘responsible 
authorities’ (police, probation and 
prison service). Numerous ‘duty 
to cooperate’ partners including 
all NHS Trusts (27); local 
authority social services (10); local 
authority housing (10); local 
authorities (10). Plus victim 
support. Perhaps 65 partners in 
total, although this figure will 
fluctuate. This case study 
comprises a large urban area. 
 
 
.  
Data analysis  
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The data gathered from our interviews are being analysed at three levels.  The first level is that of 
the MAA, the second level is that of the organisation and the third level is that of the individual 
interviewee. Thus far, we have conducted a variable-oriented analysis that has enabled us to map 
relationships between our independent and dependent variables across and between all three 
levels. This will be followed, over the next few weeks, by a theoretically-informed, case-based, 
configurational analysis of the social dynamics of each of our twelve cases. By means of this 
strategy, we hope to combine systematic, causal analysis of the social dynamics of data sharing, 
and also to situate cases in their specific historical, policy and local contexts.  
In developing interpreting data, we have been very conscious of the strengths and limits 
of the methods we used to collect them. A rich, independent, understanding of the social 
dynamics of data sharing is probably best developed by means either of systematic observations 
of over a long period of time, using an ethnographic frame, and/or systematic analysis of case 
records. Both approaches are precluded in fields such as these, because of the impossibility of 
securing informed consent from all individuals whose data researchers might encounter in the 
field. Ethical approval would not have been granted for such a project, and these methods were, 
therefore, not seriously considered. Instead, we have relied on semi-structured interviews, 
supported by a limited amount of documentary evidence and the field researchers’ observations 
and contextual awareness. These methods have allowed us to collect valuable data about 
workers’ own experiences of multi-agency working, and to develop some contextual 
understanding of these data. The obvious limitation of the data is that we are obliged to rely 
primarily on interviewees’ reported perceptions of institutional forms, on the one hand, and 
styles of data sharing, on the other. 
In the present paper, we propose to focus on a sub set of the analyses performed thus far 
on our data; those that have shed particular light on the relationship between institutional forms 
and the ways in which frontline workers navigate ethical dilemmas2. As became clear in the 
discussion above, multi-agency working in our case study fields is mandated by central 
government by means of such policy instruments as new legislation and policy guidance. Indeed, 
many of the MAAs studied in this project owe their very existence to such instruments.  We 
therefore wanted to know if our sample MAAs and their member organizations displayed strong 
hierarchical tendencies, and how, and how strongly, these tendencies impact on data sharing 
styles. However, as we also discussed above, neo-Durkheimian theory predicts that the 
sustainable and ethical institutionalization of formal policy instruments, such as these, requires 
the development of a much wider variety of institutional forms than those that are characterized 
by strong regulation. We were interested to find out if they were present, too, and with what 
effects. Conversely, we wanted to investigate whether strong institutional forms, particularly 
those involving strong assertions of hierarchy, are associated with excessive and counter-
productive behaviours predicted by neo-Durkheimian theory, and whether these behaviours are 
less evident in MAAs and organizations displaying a mix of institutional forms. 
 
Some empirical findings 
 
Institutional forms 
We begin by reporting some findings relating to these questions, in tabular form. First, we 
display a summary of our findings about the institutional forms characterizing each organisation 
in our sample. In Figure 3, three measures are reported. The first is an aggregated measure, using 
all the data from the subsidiary codes used to operationalise the concepts of social regulation and 
social integration. The second - ‘Org by MAA’ - shows the relative weight of the four basic 
institutional forms resulting from the degree of regulation coming from the MAA or national 
                                                 
2 Readers who are interested in a more complete presentation of our findings will find the first tranche of results in 
6 et al (2005b), and a more extensive analysis will be presented in 6 et al (2005c). 
 12
sources (governmental or professional), and the extent to which the organisation is integrated 
with the rest of the MAA.  The final column – ‘org by org’ - shows the institutional forms that 
result from internal regulation, and the degree to which the organization is integrated within 
itself. Where a code is repeated (e.g. HH), this denotes a comparatively pure form; hybrid forms 
are shown by a sequence of codes in the order of greatest eminence.  
 The most marked differences between these scores are, as one would expect, on the 
regulation dimension. With only a few exceptions, MAAs add regulation, and do not reduce it. 
However, although we might expect that organisations would typically be more internally 
integrated than with the rest of their MAA, some organisations actually appear less integrated 
internally than they with the rest of the MAA: these are typically ones that have been specifically 
created as a result of the formation of the MAA.  
 
Figure 3: Institutional forms of organisations in the 8 English MAAs 
 
Org. 
case no 
Org function Team 
employment 
structure 
Aggregated 
instl form code 
Org by MAA 
code 
Org by org 
code 
1A Merged NHS Trust  HH HH H/E 
1B Mental health Trust  HH HH H/E 
1EIT Early Intervention in Psychosis 
Team 
Employed by 1A EE EE EE 
1CMHT Community Mental Health 
Team 
Employed by 1A 
& 1C 
H/E E/H E/H 
1CRT Crisis Resolution Team Employed by 1A HH HH HH 
1AOT Assertive Outreach team Employed by 1A EE E/In EE 
1C Social Services (interviewee 
based in CMHT) 
 H/Is/E/In H/Is Is/H/In/E 
2A Mental Health Trust  IsIs Is/Is Is/Is 
2CRT Crisis Resolution Team Employed by 2A HH H/E HH 
2CMHT Community Mental Health 
Team 
Employed by 2A 
and 2B 
InIn Is/In In/Is 
2EPS Emergency psychiatric service Employed by 2A E/Is Is/E EE 
2B Social Services  Is/H/In/E In/E Is/In 
2MH 
Day 
Centre 
Mental Health Daycare Centre Employed by 2B H/E E/H E/H 
2AOT Assertive Outreach Team Employed by 2B 
& 2C 
E/In E/In EE 
2C Natinional charity for mental 
health 
 EE EE EE 
3A Social Services  HH HH HH 
3B Primary Care Trust  HH HH HH 
3C Local Older Person’s Charity  EE In/E EE 
3D National charity for the elderly  H/E/Is/In In E/H 
3E Housing  H/E H/E H/Is 
4A PCT  H/Is H/Is HH 
4B Social Services  HH Is/H H/Is 
4C National charity for the elderly  HH IsIs HH 
4D NHS Acute Trust  [H/Is] 
 
  
4E LA Housing, (Arms Length 
Mgt Org) 
 Is/H Is/H In/E 
5A Community Safety  H/Is H/Is H/Is 
5DAT Drug Action Team Employed by 5A H/Is H/E/In/Is EE 
5B Police  H/In HH In/H 
5C Information Services 
Partnership 
 HH HH HH 
5D Fire  H/Is Is/H H/In 
5E Sex abuse charity  H/E H/E E/H 
5G Drugs misuse clinic  Is/E InIn HH 
5H Children’s services  H/Is In/Is/E/H E/In 
6A Community Safety   HH HH HH 
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6YOS Youth Offending Service Employed by 6A HH Is/H H/Is 
6B Community Safety  IsIs IsIs Is/H 
6C Fire   InIn Is/H InIn 
6D Police  IsIs IsIs Is/In/E/H 
6E Addaction  HH E/H HH 
6F Primary care trust  Is/H Is/In/H/E IsIs 
6G Social Services; employed 
members of the DAT 
 H/Is H/Is H/Is 
6H IS Partnership  HH HH HH 
7A Probation   HH HH HH 
7B Housing  H/E IsIs H/E 
7C Social Services  H/Is H/Is H/Is 
7D Housing  HH HH HH 
7E Police  H/In H/In In/H 
7F Prison service  HH HH EE 
7G Mental health trust  H/Is H/Is H/Is 
8A Probation  H/Is H/Is H/Is 
8B Police  H/In In/H In/H 
8C Prison service  Is/H Is/In/E/H In/E 
8D Victim support  H/Is H/Is HH 
8E Housing  HH HH HH 
8F Primary Care Trust  H/Is HH IsIs 
8G Mental Health Trust  HH HH H/Is 
8H Housing  H/Is HH H/Is 
 
Data sharing styles 
Given the limitations of our methods, it is difficult to obtain robust measures of: the quantity of 
data that is actually being undertaken, how far, and in what circumstances it is being shared; 
whether data is being shared when it should be; and how far, and how well, personal privacy and 
confidentiality are being respected. The data relating to the dependent variable have therefore 
been gathered almost entirely from interviewees’ reports, backed up, where available, by 
background documents. We encouraged interviewees to be candid, assuring them of the 
anonymity of their own identities and those of their organizations and MAAs, but the data relies 
heavily on their perceptions and experiences. Indeed, when we undertake our case-based 
analysis, we will be interested in exploring in some detail how and why their framing of the issues 
differ from each other. 
Nearly all of the MAAs we examined had developed extensive formal documentation on 
the key aspects of their client information management. Most had local protocols on information 
sharing. Many had also adopted local confidentiality or privacy policies. In each case, of course, 
their work is governed by other codes that apply to their field. In the case of the crime and 
disorder field, the Association of Chief Police Officers’ Data Protection Code of Practice (2002) 
was in force during the period in which most of the interviews were conducted. After the 
Bichard Report (2004) was published, ACPO and the Information Commissioner agreed to 
develop a new code to control police information management more broadly, subsuming data 
protection (National Centre for Policing Excellence, 2005). In the fields of health and social care, 
MAAs applied codes developed by professional institutes such as the British Medical Association 
and the General Medical Council, or codes published by government departments such as the 
NHS (2003) Code of Confidentiality. Moreover, many of the MAAs are constituted around 
certain types of document, such as a constitution or a written mandate from local or national 
authorities. Even those MAAs that have come into existence as a result of local choices rather 
than central direction, tend to produce written documents specifying their powers, roles and 
purposes. It is therefore unsurprising that Figure 3 shows that many of the MAAs display a bias 
for strong regulation in general and for hierarchical organisation in particular. 
 In none of the MAAs was the handling of client records conducted entirely electronically 
at the time of the interviews. By 2004, the NHS had achieved a lower level of digitisation of 
patient data than had the police and many other criminal justice organisations. In addition, the 
delayed introduction of the NHS National Programme for Information Technology (Connecting 
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for Health), means that partnerships are either continuing to use local bespoke systems or else 
maintain paper records, and in most cases, both. The implementation of the Single Assessment 
Process for the care of older people has prompted investment in a number of specialist systems. 
By contrast, in policing, there are some well-established national system which are run on the 
Police National Computer (PNC), including the Violent Offender and Sex Offender Register 
(ViSOR),3 the new, national record system used by the MAPPAs. But there is still very little 
technological infrastructure available for sharing data between agencies in the criminal justice 
system. 
 Access authorisation rules relating to client data on these systems varied considerably 
across our sample, even in the same policy sector. Some MAAs routinely allow accredited staff 
access to the whole database, while others permit access only to specific case records on the 
basis of a particular need to know. In general, mental health agencies permit accredited 
professionals more access than do the others. This may reflect the much greater integration of 
multi-professional teams and the practice of more intensive team casework in that field. Figure 4 
summarises the key differences between MAAs in these respects.  
 
Figure 4: Styles of information sharing in 8 English MAAs. 
 
Case 
study 
Electronic records, 
paper or both 
Whose data are 
shared 
How data are organised  Scope of access to information held by other 
organisations (routine for whole database, 
case-by-case authorisation) 
1 chiefly paper HSC patient  Depends on team and/or locality At discretion of individual rather 
than via formal procedure.  
2 paper, electronic HSC patient Some electronic DS schemes being 
piloted by social services 
At team level, access at discretion of 
individual  
3 paper HSC patient Electronic version of Single 
Assessment Process (SAP) being 
piloted. 
Routine for whole database 
4  paper, electronic HSC patient  Some sharing between PCT and 
social services databases. Awaiting 
benefits of NPfIT (now Connecting 
for Health) 
Generally routine, although 
exceptional cases referred to 
Caldicott Guardian 
5 paper, electronic Offender, 
victim 
Sharing of electronic data at daily 
crime reduction meetings 
Access formalised by protocol 
drafted by MAA level body, stating 
access controls 
6 paper, electronic Offender, 
victim 
Some partners share information in 
a joint repository 
Routine, with exception of anti-
social behaviour data 
7 paper, electronic Offender; 
victim 
New database being piloted. Each case ‘has an owner’ in police 
and probation 
8 paper, electronic Offender; 
victim 
Joint access to offender database for 
police and probation  
By case by case authorisation in 
probation, prison service and Victim 
Support 
 
 
Managing tensions between data sharing and privacy 
For reasons discussed above, the assessment of how far, and how well, ethical dilemmas about 
data sharing and privacy are being resolved, depends heavily on interviewees’ reports. One proxy 
for this measure is the confidence that interviewees expressed in the adequacy, first of data 
sharing and, second, of confidentiality.  We have, therefore, constructed a simple ranking 
showing how confident the interviewees in each MAA and each organisation were, on average, 
that their MAA was sharing information of the right kind in the cases when they felt it ought to 
be shared,, and that it was respecting confidentiality appropriately. The results are presented in 
Figure 5. Clearly, averages are sometimes misleading, when they hide sharp divergences. Indeed, 
there were differences of view among the interviewees in almost every MAA, which means that, 
                                                 
3 see http://pito.org.uk/what_we_do/intelligence_investigation/visor.htm 
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almost unavoidably, the resulting averages tend to converge just on either side of moderate 
confidence.  
 
Figure 5: Interviewees’ confidence in adequacy of sharing and confidentiality protection 
in MAA 
 
Case 
study 
Interviewee 
confidence 
that 
information 
sharing in 
MAA is 
adequate 
and 
appropriate 
Comments on interview confidence in 
information sharing 
Interviewee 
confidence that 
client confidentiality 
is adequately and 
appropriately 
respected in MAA 
Comments on interviewee confidence in 
confidentiality compliance 
1 M General consensus of confidence that 
within-team sharing worked well; less 
confidence in sharing between teams 
across mental health system 
M -> H General consensus of confidence that 
within own team, confidentiality was 
respected, but less trust that others in 
MAA conformed to confidentiality norms 
2 M General consensus of confidence that 
within-team sharing worked well; less 
confidence in sharing between teams 
across mental health system; some 
distrust of other teams 
M General consensus of confidence that 
within teams, confidentiality protection 
worked well, but less confidence that 
other teams protect confidentiality as well 
as the interviewee’s own 
3 M -> H Generally high confidence significant 
divisions: voluntary organisations felt 
excluded from sharing between statutory 
services 
M -> H Generally high confidence, apparently 
based n detailed prescription in protocols 
4  M -> H Generally high confidence, but conflict 
within the housing service over the 
relative priority of demands for sharing 
and confidentiality 
M -> H Generally high confidence, apparently 
based n detailed prescription in protocols 
5 M  Some divergence of view: senior police 
officer frustrated that insufficient sharing 
was being done 
M -> L Senior police officer’s demands for more 
sharing resisted by other officers and 
others in MAA on confidentiality grounds 
6 M -> L Marked low confidence among some 
organisations that had little trust and 
limited experience of other cooperation 
with other MAA members 
M Some internal divergence among police: 
Data Protection Officer concerned about 
confidentiality opposed various proposed 
extensions of sharing, demanded specific 
written authorisations etc 
7 M -> H General consensus score: Only one 
organisation concerned was district 
council housing body feeling that sex 
offender has been “dumped” on them 
without sufficient information having 
been shared with them 
M General consensus over confidentiality, 
although some disquiet within the Mental 
Health Trust. In particular, a manager 
feared litigation if personal data was 
shared inappropriately. 
8 M -> L Great diversity of views in very large and 
fragmented MAA 
M Some concern in prison service that more 
sharing was being done than was 
appropriate in some cases 
 
 In general, it seems clear that health and social care cases show higher levels of 
interviewee confidence in the appropriateness of sharing and of confidentiality practice in their 
MAAs than do the crime and public protection ones. The highest level of confidence, overall,  
appears to be shown by interviewees in the MAAs that bring together health and social care for 
older people, and weakest level of confidence by those in CDRPs, where conflict among the 
police, and between the police and other organizations, about the appropriateness of sharing is 
particularly marked. 
 There are few cases that exhibit significant divergence in the degree of average 
interviewee confidence in the extent of compliance with confidentiality and information sharing 
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norms. In part, this reflects the fact that interviewees appeared to see these issues as correlative. 
If they had concerns about the nature and extent of sharing, they were usually on confidentiality 
grounds and conversely if they were concerned about the effects of confidentiality, it was usually 
on the ground that it blocked appropriate data sharing.  
 A richer picture emerges when data are analysed at the organizational, rather than the 
MAA, level although again the reader must bear in mind the probable skew in the distribution of 
institutional forms across the data set at this level. The theory predicts that: 
 
• organisations that are markedly hierarchical will develop a sense of confidence that they 
are conforming to the rules appropriately, so long as regulation, in particular, does not 
become excessive 
• organisations marked by isolates will show less confidence in the information sharing and 
the confidentiality practices of their own organizations, than workers in other 
organizational forms. For by definition, isolates tend to distance themselves from the 
organisations in which they are employed, and to show, at best, qualified loyalty to its 
practices. They also struggle to build trust with people in other organizations. 
• enclaves will show more confidence in their own practices than in those of the rest of the 
organisation or MAA. By definition, an enclave will want to mark the boundary between 
its internal practices, in which its members will typically show great confidence, and 
those of others, in which its members will have significantly less trust. This ambivalence 
will probably show up in moderate confidence. 
• Individualist organizations will display moderate confidence, because individualistic 
institutions cultivate a combination of wary vigilance and an effort to seize strategic 
opportunities. 
• hybrid institutional forms are more likely to yield moderate confidence, because those 
tending to support strong and those tending to support weak confidence offset each 
other. 
 
Figures 6 and 7 display simple frequencies on the data set of 55 organisations in England, and 
show the distribution of high, medium and low confidence in organisations’ capacity for data 
sharing when appropriate (Figure 6) and in organisations’ confidentiality arrangements (Figure 7), 
by institutional form. The results have been colour coded with the three traffic light colours to 
pick out associations with strong confidence (green), moderate confidence (yellow) and weak 
confidence (red). The colours on each line are given a letter code in the far right hand column 
for ease of viewing in monochrome printing. The colour coding has mainly been used where 
there is a continuous set of entries along part of a row. The tendencies are clear, although not 
absolute – as one would expect with associations found using this kind of coding at this level of 
aggregation and with the kinds of error bands to be expected of modest N qualitative research.  
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Figure 6: Confidence in organisations’ appropriate information sharing, by institutional 
form 
 
Institutional 
Form 
H H -> 
M 
M -> 
H 
M M -> 
L 
L -> 
M 
L Totals Colour 
code 
HH 3 1 7 4 0 2 1 18 G 
IsIs 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 R 
EE 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 4 G (H) – R 
(M-L) 
InIn 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2  
H/Is 1 1 3 5 1 1 0 12 G 
H/Is/E/In 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 G 
H/E 2 0 0 1 0 1 1 5 G (H) – R 
(M-L) 
H/E/Is/In 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1  
H/In 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 3 Y 
Is/H 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 3 R 
Is/H/In/E 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1  
Is/E 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 R/Y 
E/Is 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Y 
E/In 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1  
          
Totals 8 2 11 16 3 11 5 55  
 
Figure 7: Confidence in organisations’ respecting confidentiality, by institutional form 
 
Institutional 
Form 
H H -> 
M 
M -> 
H 
M M -> 
L 
L -> 
M 
L Totals Colour 
code 
HH 4 3 5 5 0 1 0 18 G 
IsIs 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 R 
EE 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 4 G (H) – Y 
(M) 
InIn 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 Y 
H/Is 2 2 1 4 1 2 0 12 G 
H/Is/E/In 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1  
H/E 2 0 2 0 0 1 0 5 G (H-M) – 
Y (M) 
H/E/Is/In 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1  
H/In 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 3 Y 
Is/H 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3 Y 
Is/H/In/E 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1  
Is/E 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 R 
E/Is 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 Y 
E/In 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 Y 
          
Totals 10 6 11 17 3 6 2 55  
 
 
Figures 8 and 9 display the same traffic light analysis of the data set by the function or sector. 
Given their greater articulation of individualism in their institutional mix, the police are slightly 
more likely to be associated with weak confidence on both dimensions. Interestingly and 
revealingly, confirming the theory, interviewees in voluntary bodies, which exhibit greater 
tendencies than other bodies toward enclaved institutional forms, tend to show greater 
confidence in their ability to respect confidentiality (marking boundaries) than in sharing 
information appropriately (blurring boundaries). 
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Figure 8: Confidence in organisations’ appropriate sharing of information, by functional 
type 
 
Org sector H H -> 
M 
M -> 
H 
M M -> 
L 
L -> 
M 
L  Totals  Colour 
code 
NHS – MH 5 0 2 3 0 2 1 13 G 
NHS – PCT 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 4 Y 
Local Auth  – 
general 
0 0 1 2 0 2 0 4 Y 
Social 
Services 
1 0 3 2 0 2 0 8 G 
Housing 1 1 0 2 0 0 2 6 G (H-M) – R 
(L) 
Community 
Safety 
0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 Y 
Police 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 R 
Probation 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 2 G 
Prison  0 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 Y 
Fire 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2  
Voluntary 0 0 0 2 1 3 1 7 R 
Private 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1  
          
Total 8 2 10 14 3 11 5 55  
 
 
Figure 9: Confidence in organisations’ respecting confidentiality, by functional type 
 
Org sector H H -> 
M 
M -> 
H 
M M -> 
L 
L -> 
M 
L  Totals  Colour 
code 
NHS – MH 5 1 2 3 2 0 0 13 G 
NHS – PCT 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 4 Y 
Local Auth  – 
general 
0 0 1 1 0 2 0 4 Y 
Social 
Services 
1 1 3 2 0 1 0 8 G (H-M) Y 
(M) 
Housing 0 1 1 2 0 2 0 6 Y 
Community 
Safety 
0 0 0 2 0 0 0 2  
Police 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 4 R 
Probation 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 Y 
Prison  0 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 Y 
Fire 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 G (H) – Y 
(M) 
Voluntary 3 0 1 3 0 0 0 7 G 
Private 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 R 
          
Total 10 6 11 17 3 6 2 55  
 
Finally, Figure 10 displays an analysis of the differences between interviewees’ level of 
confidence in their organizations’ capacity for data sharing and their level of confidence in 
confidentiality arrangements, by institutional form. 
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Table 10: Differences between confidence in sharing and confidentiality by institutional 
form 
 
Institutional form Confidence in appropriate information sharing greater than confidence in 
respecting confidentiality (total) 
HH 2 (18) 
EE 1 (4) 
H/Is 2 (12) 
H/E 1 (5) 
Is/E 1 (1) 
  
Total 
7 (55) 
 
Institutional form Confidence in respecting confidentiality greater than confidence in appropriate 
information sharing (total) 
HH 4 (18) 
EE 3 (4) 
InIn 1 (2) 
H/Is 3 (12) 
H/E 3 (5) 
H/E/Is/In 1 (1) 
H/In 1 (3) 
Is/H 3 (3) 
Is/H/In/E 1 (1) 
E/In 1 (1) 
  
Total  
21 (55) 
 
Institutional form No difference between confidence in approp-riate information sharing and  
confidence  in respecting confidentiality (total) 
HH 12 (18) 
IsIs 2 (2) 
InIn 1 (2) 
H/Is 7 (15) 
H/Is/E/In 1 (1) 
H/E 1 (5) 
H/In 2 (3) 
E/Is 1 (1) 
  
Total 27 (55) 
 
 
Discussion: the relationship between independent and dependent variables 
In this section, we discuss the main findings that emerge from these analyses, in the light of our 
theoretical framing of ethical dilemmas created by tensions between data sharing and privacy.  
We will illustrate the discussion, too, by drawing on discursive evidence in our interview data. In 
particular, we ran a qualitative search of those codes that provide information about the kinds of 
worries interviewees have about data sharing and confidentiality. In particular, we systematically 
reviewed the evidence provided by professionals and managers about the sources  of, and points 
of reference for, the ethical frames they bring to ethical dilemmas. We also searched these codes 
for their views about the effectiveness and utility of legal frameworks, organizational rules, 
professional codes and inter-organisational protocols relating to data sharing and confidentiality.  
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Hierarchy 
We are, in general, somewhat cautious about our analysis of this institutional form, because 
formal aspects of institutions are notoriously easier to pick up in structured coding schemes than 
informal ones. This effect may be exaggerated, too, because of the primacy, and therefore the 
visibility, of formal policy instrumentation in the establishment of the MAAs – in particular, it 
may exaggerate the level of regulation. The discussion in this section must therefore be read with 
an awareness of a possible skew in the data set toward institutional forms on the right hand side 
of the matrix in Figure 1, that is, towards hierarchical institutions, in particular, and highly 
regulated institutions, in general.  
In hierarchical settings, we would expect sharing and confidentiality practices to be matters 
of rule following, and to be undertaken in conformity with professional norms, organizational 
status and ascribed responsibiltiies. The two sets of MAAs conforming most closely to this 
institutional form are the local implementation teams for the National Service Frameworks for 
care for older people (cases 3 and 4)., and the MAPPas (cases 7 and 8). Both sets of MAAs have 
been established relatively recently, but in both cases their programmes are subject to 
considerable central government prescription and, in the case of the MAPPAs, their data sharing 
processes are also being embedded in nationally-imposed IT systems.  
Our analysis confirms, overall, that that, as predicted by theory, an element of hierarchy (H) 
in the institutional mix tends to increase confidence that data are being shared appropriately, and 
that confidentiality is being properly respected. The presence of hierarchy tends, indeed, to be 
associated with increased confidence in both dimensions of data handling. So far as excessive 
regulation is concerned, there was, overall, in our data set, rather less grumbling by interviewees 
about the inhibiting effect of laws, rules and codes than we expected, and this generally holds, 
too, for organizations characterized by strong hierarchy (HH). This is surprising. In general, 
studies in the UK have tended to find that data protection laws and codes are widely perceived 
by frontline workers to inhibit effective multi-agency working. Our data, however, does not 
contain much evidence that workers experience data protection law as a strong inhibitor of their 
own data sharing practices, and this holds for codes and protocols, too. In contrast, our 
interviews contain far more complaints that workers in other agencies within the same MAA use 
data protection law and privacy codes as excuses for not sharing data that they are unwilling to 
share for other, less acceptable, reasons. 
This is not to say organizations with strong H characteristics do not display evidence of 
excessive or inappropriate social regulation. Sometimes, the over-zealous but misdirected 
strengthening of formal regulation, in particular, leads to unethical behaviour in Maesschalck’s 
terms. The problems are of several kinds. Perhaps the most pervasive problem, especially in the 
strong H cases mentioned above (3, 4, 7 and 8), stems from the over-zealous or careless 
imposition of formal rules from on high - from the top of the MAA, from the professional body 
or from government – in situations where they do not appear to street level workers to have an 
obvious rationale or purpose. The problem is compounded if the action that is supposed to 
follow from them is far from clear. Especially when formal regulation is not underpinned by 
shared, implicit understandings of ethical practice, the attempt to reinforce formal regulation 
may highlight, rather than help to resolve, the ethical dilemmas that workers face. Here, for 
example, is a quotation from a probation service manager in case 8, a MAPPA: 
 
… if there’s a piece of legislation would come down such as the MAPPA legislation which is saying you have 
a duty to cooperate and you sort of have a duty to share information but it feels as if the legislative framework 
to allow that information sharing to happen it doesn’t feel it is in place and it feels as if there’s a tension um 
all the time between the duty to cooperate and if you like the ability to cooperate and I think it is a real 
tension and the act would be quoted would the Data Protection Act (Manager, Org: 8A). 
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In such a context, too, the proliferation of codes and rules that are intended to provide more 
clarity, simply adds to the problem, as an interview with a manager of a day centre in Case 2 
illustrates well: 
 
Well I mean, the thing is, I’ll refer to psychological guidelines by the association, I would refer to social work 
guidelines. I’ll refer to nursing guidelines …. We have got guidelines but we haven’t got a policy (Manager, Org 
2B). 
 
A second problem in strongly regulated settings, is that the existence of codes and rules may 
become a fig-leaf for practices that might otherwise be considered unacceptable. Here is a 
Superintendent of Police speaking about the liberating impact of the Crime and Disorder Act 
1998, which established a legal mandate for data sharing to prevent or detect crime: 
  
 ... the Crime and Disorder Act, and I can’t quote the section, but there is a particular section around, 
really runs a train right through data protection because it says, well you know if it’s in the interests of preventing 
crime and disorder and it’s a responsible body that you’re giving it to, then go ahead and give it and that’s … the 
permission that we take to do it. In terms of best practice erm we’re not there yet because we don’t have a protocol 
which covers everything that we’re actually, we actually share (Manager, Org: 5B). 
 
Yet another problem is that the existence of a strong regulatory framework can undermine 
workers’ sensitivity to the ethical nature of decisions, by relieving them of a personal sense 
responsibility for them. In other words, strong formal regulation may push behaviour down-grid 
by encouraging isolate responses to ethical dilemmas. As a worker in a Drug Action Team in 
Case 5 told us, when asked if they were more worried about being blamed for sharing or not 
sharing data: ‘From a personal side, as long as I could justify to myself that I’d followed due process …. I think 
from a personal side it really wouldn’t matter to me’.  
As neo-Durkheimian theory would predict, then, the attempt to control behaviour by 
means of stronger formal regulation can, in practice, undermine the very capacity for ethical 
decision-making that it is supposed to reinforce.  It does this by confounding or masking the 
ethical dilemmas that workers face, rather than providing help in navigating them ethically. In 
contrast, the mitigation of strong formal regulation by strong informal institutions may be more 
supportive of ethical decisions. As organizational sociologists know well (e.g. Misztal, 2000), 
effective, stable, hierarchical institutions rely as much on informal and unstated aspects of the 
social order as they do upon the formal, explicitly codified rules. In this context, the ability to 
navigate dilemmas with confidence rests mainly on experience, training, inter-personal trust and 
shared professional mores. Interviews given by professionals and their managers about their data 
sharing and confidentiality practices provide many reports of high satisfaction with data sharing 
practices, on these grounds.  Here, for example, is a manager who works in an organization 
coded HH, and who is very confident about his team’s data sharing practices. What is 
abundantly clear, too, is that their confidence, relies much more on a deeply ingrained, sense 
professionalism – and one, too, that is shared with other workers - rather than on the 
organisation’s rules: 
 
 I think there are Trust guidelines, but I can’t remember or even flicked through them, but I would have a 
very good idea of what was confidential, and it would be from my own professional organization and professional 
training (Team leader, Mental Health Trust. Org 1B) 
 
We have written in some length in another paper (6 et al, 2005b) about the dysfunctions 
associated with excessive reliance on formal regulation. As we have begun to see above, informal 
institutions can provide the means of providing organizational members with subjective 
understanding of the meaning and purposes of rules. They may also provide an institutionally-
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sanctioned means of bypassing obstructive ones or dealing with gaps or contradictions in them. 
At the same time, strong reliance on informal practices can creates problems, especially if it 
becomes difficult for workers, and especially for their managers, to read informal institutions 
accurately. At best, there is a danger that, in the absence of obvious evidence to the contrary, 
managers simply assume that patterns of behaviour that have become routines and normal are 
necessarily ethical and acceptable. At worst, the workrounds and stratagems that come to be 
employed import inconsistencies and particularities into organisation’s handling of ethical 
dilemmas and can thereby legitimate unethical behaviour. What is certain, is that the absence of 
transparency undermines an organisation’s ability to assure its ethical standards. 
  
Isolate 
As predicted, strong articulation of isolate institutional forms tends to decrease confidence on 
both dimensions.  In settings where isolate ordering plays a significant part in the mix, we would 
expect information sharing to be opportunistic, a matter of day to day coping, rather than based 
on principled decision. Isolates find various ways of distancing themselves from the form of 
social regulation under which they operate; that is, they conform to it both without enthusiasm 
and without strategy Indeed, in ethical terms, we would expect isolate institutional forms to be 
associated with an indifference to ethical issues, rather than with the positive challenging of them 
or the conscious overriding of them. But this indifference is the very source of the ethical 
problems that are predicted to be associated with isolate forms. In particular, isolate institutions 
may foster indifference to, or fatalistic acceptance of, the consequences of actions for which 
individuals feel able or willing to take no responsibility.  
Isolate elements are most strongly apparent in Case Study 6, a CDRP in a rural area. The 
predicted problems are, indeed, evident in this case. For example, in the interview quoted below, 
a manager of a community safety team describes how data sharing fulfills the organisation’s 
objectives, even though they recognise that it risks overriding professional principles. But – so 
distant is the manager even from professional codes, let alone from organisational ones – that 
they describe ‘riding roughshod’ over clients’ rights as a ‘technical’ matter: 
 
Erm, within the organisation I accept it, erm, I signed up objectives of the 
organisation and the guidance issued by Government.  I actually think it, I think 
it’s, it runs the risk of being excessive, the amount of information we’re sharing and, 
and erm, in a sense you’re technically in danger of riding roughshod over individuals’ 
rights. (Manager, Community Safety Team. Org: 6B).) 
 
Conversely, interviewees from organizations displaying significant isolate elements were more 
likely than any other set of interviewees to be critical of their own data sharing or confidentiality 
practices, or of those of their organisations. This willingness to be critical is partly a function of 
their moral and psychological dissociation from the organization in which they work. But it 
sometimes allows the exercise of independent moral reasoning, albeit moral reasoning which 
never quite connects with decision processes in the wider MAA. The lack of confidence in the 
practices of their organizations is manifest in several ways. Some workers simply do the best they 
can on a case by case basis, knowing that matters are far from right, but with no great confidence 
that they will improve. Here, for example, is a professional worker in a Drug Action Team in the 
same CDRP, talking about the constraints imposed by confidentiality rules on their ability to 
work in a multi-agency setting, but apparently accepting them in a fatalistic manner 
 
No, I think we, we all understand the constraints under which we’ve got to… I can’t issue crime, I can’t issue 
police officers with health data, I can’t issue Health crime data, erm, and we just have to, to play in that way. 
(Org 6G). 
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As we saw above, other workers cope by dissociating themselves from the ethical consequences 
of their actions, and others, still, resort to behaviour that is designed simply to defends 
themselves against blame for unfortunate consequences. One strong theme that emerges from 
interviews across our data set is the use made of data protection legislation or professional 
confidentiality norms to insulate professional workers from exercising professional responsibility 
for sharing data appropriately. For example, in case study 8, a MAPPA, overall a strongly 
hierarchical MAA, we found several agencies complaining about psychiatrists who are unable or 
unwilling to resolve dilemmas presented by patient confidentiality, on the one hand, and the risk 
associated with mentally ill people, on the other: 
 
 …there was certainly one occasion where it had been reported that an individual was extremely dangerous and 
er should not be seen, no-one should see the person on their own. That was reported as being a comment from 
the psychiatrist who had been looking after this guy, but we couldn’t get a psychiatrist to actually say that. 
Couldn’t actually get him to put that into a report or to provide any advice to us. And that is frustrating, and 
that was frustrating. And I think he sort of held, he hid behind the patient confidentiality (Director of 
Public Health in a Primary Care Trust: Org 8F). 
 
Another manifestation of the lack of confidence in data sharing or privacy arrangements is to call 
for reform. One of the more interesting hybrid forms in our sample is the H/IS form. 
Interviewees situated in this form tended, as would be predicted by theory, to exhibit high 
problems in forming trusting relationships across, or even within, organizational boundaries, and 
they also had a high awareness of the ethical problems. But interspersed in their accounts are 
specific calls for reform, and in some cases, some tentative optimism that matters might 
improve. In other words, the injection of some element of H seems to create some confidence in 
that direction.  
 
Enclave 
The articulation of enclaved elements within the institutional mix is predicted to be associated 
with patterns of information sharing that strongly differentiate the in-group, within which 
sharing will be regarded as vital, and out-groups, with whom information sharing will be 
regarded with suspicion. Consistently with the hypothesis, the mental health case studies, where 
enclaved elements are most clearly marked, show the greatest tendency to emphasise sharing of 
client information within the specialist team (assertive outreach, crisis resolution etc). There is 
also a distinct tendency not to trust other teams within the wider MAA with information. The 
excesses of enclaved organizations stem, then, from inappropriate concern with boundaries and 
inflexible attachment to principles which define their special purpose or character. The overall 
tendency is to inhibit data sharing across the MAA, even when it is appropriate, and to make a 
fetish of the principle of confidentiality as a way of policing those boundaries. Here, by way of 
example, is a very clear statement of such an approach, from the head of a resettlement service 
working in a prison: 
 
…we take the view that confidentiality is within the organisation, so we need … more people need to know what’s 
happening, but it’s kept within the organisation and that’s where the confidentiality stops when it goes out (Head 
of Resettlement Service, Org: 7F). 
 
Enclaves also tend to develop strong clientalistic relationships with those they perceive as their 
particular supporters or stakeholders.  That is to say, they tend to develop a strong sense of 
loyalty to what they regard as their own client base, and to protect their interests, as they 
perceive them, in competition with other client groups or from the incursions of other 
professional workers. This is an important source of the commitment to clients or patients often 
displayed by enclaves in the social policy world, but it is also a potential source of unethical 
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behaviour. Here is a worker in an emergency psychiatric team, which has frequently to deal with 
mentally-ill people in a confused, distressed and, sometime, a dangerous state. They are 
complaining about the unwillingness of the local Drug Action Team to share data about their 
clients.  
 
 Well because of the nature of their work, they’ve got like a very, they’ve got very strict confidentiality rules 
between themselves and their clients. And unless the client has got a written statement with us here 
authorising us to get information from drug and alchohol teams they just wouldn’t give us any information 
(Psychiatric worker. Org 2E) 
 
Enclaves can also be a source of concern within the hierarchy of MAAs, because of their over 
confidence about their own, internal data sharing practices and their unwillingness to integrate 
with the rest of the MAA: 
 
I don’t like the idea of teams having their own little confidentiality sort thing, you know. We need to be 
mindful of confidentiality, and we need to be sharing information with other people within a fair 
framework of risk and we need to be mindful of people’s confidentiality because it can break down. People 
can get free and easy (Team Manager, Org 1B). 
 
Enclaved institutional forms are to be found most often in teams on the margins of MAAs in 
our sample, and since this is where many voluntary organizations are to be found. The result is 
that they inhibit data sharing between the statutory sector and the voluntary sector in multi-
agency settings. In general, they tend both to result from and to reinforce distrust between 
organizations. While they can sometimes act as the voice of principle and a source of ethical 
awareness within an MAA, they can also undermine effective multi-agency working in significant 
ways. 
 
Individualism 
In settings which exhibit a greater degree of individualism (In), albeit in settlement with 
hierarchical and other elements, we expect sharing to be agreed on a case-by-case basis, and 
subject to individual discretion. Because weakly regulated institutions allow greater scope for 
disagreement between individuals, and for differing interpretations of the same practices or rules, 
we should also expect the emergence of conflict. This may erupt between formally sanctioned 
authorities and people in subaltern roles, or between people in different agencies. We would also 
expect the weak level of social integration to lead either to a more instrumental attitude to data 
sharing and confidentiality than in enclaved settings, or to the strong assertion of personal ethical 
standards.   
 These features are, indeed, to be found clearly in organizations in our sample with 
significant In elements, and especially in case study 5, a CDRP. This MAA included two 
managers (B and D) engaged in vigorous individualistic behaviour that ran counter to the 
information sharing culture of their organisations (B and D). Ethical considerations were clearly 
subordinated to their desired outcomes. When asked about their approach to information 
sharing, a police superintendent (who is also quoted above) talked freely of their role in 
influencing the employment of street wardens by the local authority to tackle anti-social 
behaviour. In this instance, the interviewee took a personal role in vetting their suitability, and 
justified blocking one individual in the following way: 
 
And that individual had been arrested for murder, erm and er was not, I think was charged and 
acquitted, but there was very real concerns about the person's character and there're the sort of things 
that they needed to know but I really and truly I've influenced that person's employment and and 
and again you're back to, does the end justify the means, and I dare say a barrister could earn a few 
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pounds out of [XXX] Police for that particular case, but what do you do, you know do you then 
that run by and you have somebody who has a fetish for martial arts erm become a street warden to 
go out and tackle anti social behaviour, I think (laughs) it would be madness. (Police 
Superintendent: Org 5B) 
 
 This focus on instrumental action in relation to substance of the particular judgments about 
the use of information is supported by an instrumental approach to making decisions. The 
process typically involves cutting deals with colleagues and in playing the role of broker or 
kingpin between different groups, by securing personal control of expertise: 
  
Now the information sharing there [with local authority housing and Sure Start] is fantastic, 
because if you want any information you just walk next door and ask and it's done, and it's done 
because they share the same canteen, they share the same changing facilities, you know what I mean, 
it is one, it is one body that actually work together, so if you ask them what the protocols are, I 
suppose you ask me cos I'm responsible for them, the answer is there aren't any, they just do it, they 
work together on a day to day basis because they're all dealing with the same problems, erm and 
assisting each other in tackling their problems… (Police Superintendent: Org 5B) 
 
Where elements of In are present in otherwise strongly integrated organizations, we have found 
some evidence of individualistic behaviour amongst people who believe that their personal 
effectiveness depends on stratagems at odds with a dominant culture.  This is most marked in 
our sample amongst the police whose results-oriented training tends to grate against the greater 
preoccupation of caring and health professionals with the rights of their clients. It is in this 
context that we found some of the clearest expressions in our local cases, of the clash between 
the dominant individualist ethical system that privileges the immediate rights of known 
individuals and a Utilitarian framing of data sharing that wants to privilege the interests of the 
wider public, however distal the risk. Here, for example, is another senior policeman, who is 
joint chair of the MAPPA in case study 7. He is speaking in an interview in which he stands up 
for an ethical  position which he knows not to be consistently shared. He does so on the grounds 
that, in a field devoted to protecting the public against particularly repugnant crimes, the free 
sharing of almost all personal data can be justified. For this person, there is a straight choice 
between data sharing and privacy, and they are confident they how to make it. 
 
 I would say that any snippet of information from whatever source could prove to be crucial in the 
management of a sex offender. Now at the end of the day, I appreciate there have got to be safeguards 
which are built into that and the safeguards of the human rights act etc. But you’ve got to look at the 
duty of care we have as a statutory agency in terms of the management of the whole issue around public 
protection (Police: Org 7E). 
 
As one would expect, then, the presence of conflict over data sharing in organisations with a 
significant element of IN is associated with generally low confidence that both data sharing and 
confidentiality practices are appropriate.  
 
Conclusions 
Public services in the UK are being asked to share information with other agencies in order to 
manage behavioural risks and, at the same time, are under increased pressure to maintain the 
appropriate confidentiality of their clients’ personal information and of the personal information 
of other people too. As political concern with risk has risen, the government has decided to 
introduced multi-agency arrangements mandated to manage risk. In so doing, it has also 
introduced rules that are steadily more formal, explicit and detailed, in the hope of ensuring 
greater horizontal consistency in decision making, especially decision-making about data sharing.. 
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 The analysis presented here gives little room, however, for believing that these changes 
have eliminated the dilemmas facing frontline workers, nor have they limited scope for discretion 
and judgment. Indeed, what may well have happened is that the difficulties of resolving these 
dilemmas have been increased. The proliferation of laws, rules, codes and protocols compound 
the problems of ethical decision making. Nor has the introduction of such rules obviated the 
problems of interpreting them, resolving conflicts, and in some cases, finding ways round the  
rules. 
 It is clear, too, that the ways in which frontline workers choose to navigate these 
dilemmas is shaped by the institutional setting within which dilemmas are framed and choice 
exercised. We have demonstrated the usefulness of neo-Durkheimian institutional theory in 
analysing how judgments about personal information are made in some prominent policy fields. 
The study shows that distinct styles of handling personal information and that these styles can be 
explained by their consistency with the deeper institutional character of the organisational 
settings in which they are found. Ways of managing personal information and the settlements 
between confidentiality and privacy, are seen to be intelligible and understandable responses to 
these organizational settings. In particular, the interaction of formal and other types of regulation 
teaches us that there are limits to law makers’ capacity for prescribing how agencies make 
choices between the risks associated with false negative and false positive judgments when 
dealing with needy, vulnerable or risky people. The upshot of all this is that we cannot expect 
public services to manage ethical dilemmas with the transparency, consistency and predictability 
that we might like. 
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